Zwischen Orient und Europa

Although Ritter, who felt his insufficient knowledge of Arabic was compensated by his genuine interest in Arabic and Islamic philosophy,14 could admit this and other blunders in his interpretation of Avicenna, Ibn Bajja and Averroes, he was not yet prepared to recognize the importance and originality of Jewish medieval philosophy. Munk drew Ritter’s attention to the fact that Maimonides, and perhaps other Jewish philosophers as well, had been an essential source for Christian scholars in their study of medieval Aristotelian Arabic philosophical texts. Commenting on Ritter’s lack of regard for Maimonides, Munk noted that “one might well expect more from such a thorough and conscientious researcher. It appears to us that at least Maimonides, whose Guide for the Perplexed is available in Buxdorf’s Latin translation, should have deserved some attention.”15

Ritter responded, in his own review of Munk’s translation of Sa’adia Gaon’s Book of Beliefs and Opinions, as follows:

Herr Munk macht mir den Vorwurf, dass ich in meiner Geschichte der Philosophie die Werke der jüdischen Philosophen nicht genug berücksichtigt hätte. Wenn er dies besonderes auf Moses Maimonides bezieht, so will ich zugestehen, dass ich auf ihn etwas genauer hätte eingehen können, weiss aber doch kaum zu sagen, welche neuen Einsichten daraus hervorgegangen sein würden… Meine Meinung über die jüdischen Philosophie ging von der allgemeinen Betrachtung aus, dass die Juden in der Zerstreuung ihre literarische Bildung überall an die Literatur der Völker, unter welchen sie lebten, angeschlossen haben, was sehr natürlich ist.16

In addition to rectifying Ritter’s errors and deepening the insights contained in his text, Munk’s essays were also meant to draw the attention of the German Orientalists to the importance and originality of Arabic philosophy which, as Munk had written in his entry in Adolphe Franck’s Dictionary of Philosophy, had passed through “more or less all the phases in which [philosophy] had appeared in the Christian world,” including “dogmatism, skepticism, the theory of emanation” and even “doctrines analogous to Spinozism and modern pantheism”:

En général, on peut dire que la philosophie chez les Arabes, loin de se borner au péripatetisme pur, a traversé à peu près toutes les phases dans lesquelles elle s’est montrée dans le monde chrétien. Nous y retrouvons le dogmatisme, le scepticisme, la théorie de l’émanation et même quelquefois des doctrines analogues au spinozisme et au panthéisme moderne. 17

This aspect of Munk’s work can be better appreciated when seen in the context of the collaboration that existed between German and Jewish scholars of Islamic and Jewish Studies around 1845 – a phenomenon described by Ismar Schorsch in his essay on the intersection of Jewish and Islamic Studies in nineteenth-century Germany. According to Schorsch, this collaboration was largely the result of the efforts of Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer, Germany’s most prominent Arabist and founder of the Deutschen-Morgenländischen-Gesellschaft, who was also a friend and admirer of Munk’s.18 Evidence of the high regard in which Fleischer held Munk is provided by a letter of 1857 in which Munk expresses his gratitude for his friend’s warm response to the first volume of his translation of the Guide:

Your heartfelt words stirred me deeply … If anything is able to strengthen my resolve to persevere in my arduous efforts, it is the encouragement offered by men like you. [Moreover], your favorable opinion of my work is of supreme importance to me. Given how much stock I put in your judgment, I have reason to hope that my edition and translation of the Guide will not be unworthy of the attention of Orientalists, theologians and philosophers.19

Another piece of evidence quoted by Schorsch are letters by Fleischer in which the latter, impressed by “Munk’s facility with Arabic and familiarity with Jewish philosophy” repeatedly mentions Munk to his friend, the philologist and Orientalist Konrad Dietrich Hassler.20

Munk’s work, which combined the techniques of Protestant biblical criticism with a deep knowledge of Hebrew and Arabic, attempted to challenge and undermine the hegemony of Christian theology vis-à-vis its position on Judaism, and to rewrite the history of the West from a distinctly Jewish perspective. As the debate with Ritter shows, Munk chose the study of the reciprocal relationship between Christian, Jewish and Islamic thought as the symbolic battleground for his debate with Christian scholars.

The conclusion of Munk’s review was that Ritter’s work, even when bolstered with the details on the Islamic authors furnished by Munk’s essays, was insufficient: sooner or later, a comprehensive history of Arabic philosophy would have to be written. At the same time, Munk took Ritter’s answer as a challenge to write his own history of Jewish philosophy, the Esquisse historique de la philosophie chez les Juifs, which he published two years later.

Despite a certain resentment, Ritter was willing to concede his mistake and give Munk credit for having proven to him the importance of Jewish philosophers in the philosophical development of the Middle Ages, placing them on equal footing with their Muslim and Christian contemporaries. In the second edition of his history, Ritter, using Munk’s articles as sources, added numerous important details on Al-Ghazali, Ibn Bajja and Averroes, as well as a new section on the history of medieval Jewish philosophy which relies principally on Munk’s edition of the Fons Vitae.

Ritter’s admission and recognition was an extraordinarily important achievement for Munk – a success that can be seen, in a more general sense, as a victory for the Science of Judaism as a whole. In discussing Munk’s central role in the growing influence of the movement on Christian scholarship, Leopold Löw emphasized:

Munk war einer der ersten jüdischen Adepten der arabischen Sprache und Literatur, deren Studium von den jüdischen Gelehrten gänzlich vernachlässigt worden war, wiewohl es seit dem siebzehnten Jahrhundert nicht an Anregung dazu fehlte. Da aber die Sprache der christlichen Orientalisten die von den allerwenigsten jüdischen Gelehrten verstandene lateinische war, so ging der Aufschwung, den die arabischen und syrischen Studien seit dem siebzehnten Jahrhundert allmählich nahmen, an den jüdischen Schulen ganz spurlos vorüber. Erst im dritten Jahrzehnt unseres Jahrhunderts stellen sich einige jüdische Jünglinge unter die Fahne eines umfassenden semitischen Sprachstudiums. Unter diesen befand sich Salomon Munk. 21

Although Munk, as we learn from his Esquisse historique, inherited this conception, which brought him to emphasize the role of the medieval Jewish philosophers as mediators of Greek thought to the West through the medium of Arabic and Islamic philosophy, he also challenged the predominant view of his time from a Jewish perspective, proposing a novel reconstruction of the general history of philosophy. Referring in particular to the medieval era – he argued for the existence of one philosophical tradition, written in (at least) three languages: Greek, Arabic and Hebrew, with Latin as a potential fourth language. Furthermore, Munk suggested that the efforts of thinkers like Maimonides to create a synthesis of philosophy and Judaism had also raised the possibility of an original Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages. With this interpretation – which, one must note, was not devoid of clichés, including the view of the medieval Arab thinkers as mere mediators – Munk became an important voice in the debate on the role of the Arabs (and the Jews) in the transmission of Greek philosophy to European culture.

By raising awareness of the interconnectedness between Islamic and Jewish Studies Munk revolutionized the study of medieval Jewish and Arabic philosophy. Confronted with a history of philosophy articulated from a prevalently Christian perspective, Munk not only argued against the ideas of German and French Orientalists and historians, who used linguistic arguments to “prove” the inferiority or non-rationality of Semitic cultures, but challenged the very foundations – philosophical as well as anthropological – of this idea.22 In so doing, Munk rediscovered the complex process of the transmission of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy through the works of the medieval Arabic and Jewish philosophers – an entire world that had been practically off-limits for centuries.23

Munk’s achievements in this field, inspired by his universalistic interpretation of Judaism, were unique even compared to the significant contributions made by Munk’s fellow German-Jewish scholars to the critical study of Judaism in the nineteenth century.24 In addition to his achievements as a librarian, cataloguer and editor of Hebrew, Arabic and Judeo-Arabic texts,25 it was the widespread influence he exerted on the scholarship of his time – fostered and facilitated by the relatively open intellectual atmosphere in France – that distinguished Munk from his colleagues. Writing in French, Munk was in a position to capture the attention of (and engage in open discussion with) the leading French and German scholars of Oriental Studies, becoming a protagonist in the war of linguistic and philological competency that raged between Orientalists and historians of philosophy in the mid-nineteenth century in the context of the philological and critical study of the Arabic commentaries of Aristotle.

The Academic Reception of Beḥinat haDat: Criticizing Jewish Historiography

Michael Engel

“The academic study of Judaism […] has its origins in a highly charged political environment and consequently emerged as an apologetic enterprise”. This passage, cited from Aaron Hughes’ Study of Judaism,1 contains in a nutshell one of the main theses of his book. According to Hughes, the field of Jewish studies or מחשבת ישראל has its roots in a profoundly apologetic enterprise. “The sense of mission and the desire to defend Judaism from the attacks of non-Jews”, Hughes writes, “played a formative role in the disciplinary formation of Jewish studies, and it is one that seems – whether consciously or unconsciously – to have remained at the heart of Jewish studies into the present.”2 The validity of Hughes’ claim will be attested in this paper by turning to a particular test case – the academic reception of Beḥinat haDat (henceforth BH) and the consequent canonization of its author, Elijah Del Medigo (c. 1460-1493), within the field of Jewish studies. Del Medigo’s story illustrates both aspects of Hughes’ claim: the apologetic roots of Jewish studies, on the one hand, and the impact of the apologetic formative stages on the current stage within the field, on the other.

Before embarking on my analysis, I will provide a few bibliographical notes concerning the protagonist of this paper. Elijah Del Medigo was a Jew born in Crete in the second half of the 15^th century. Del Medigo received a traditional education and, most likely, a certain degree of philosophical training already at home. Crete being under Venetian rule at the time, the young Del Medigo moved to the lagoon city and spent almost ten years travelling between the cities of north Italy, mainly Venice and Padua.3 During this period, Del Medigo was unofficially associated with the University of Padua, an affiliation clearly manifested in his literary activity. All of Del Medigo’s works written in Italy orbited around the thought of the 12^th-century Andalusian philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd), who, thanks to the Latin translations of his works, was among the most influential authors studied at the University of Padua at the time. Del Medigo had access to both Hebrew and Latin versions of Averroes’ works, and played a major role in introducing the ideas of the Cordovan philosopher to his Christian patrons and benefactors,4 translating the Hebrew versions of Averroes’ works from Hebrew into Latin, and composing works which elucidated Averroes’ ideas on Aristotelian physics, metaphysics, logic and psychology. In composing such works and translations on themes that were not particularly ‘Jewish’, Del Medigo was participating in the intellectual endeavor of a non-Jewish intellectual milieu.5 I will return to this point later on.

Sometime around 1490, Del Medigo returned to his native Crete (where he was to pass away a few years later) and composed his last and most celebrated work, the BH. Unlike his previous works, BH was written in Hebrew, explicitly addressing a Jewish readership, and treating themes that were widely discussed within the medieval Jewish tradition.6 Most notably, BH examines the relation between reason and revelation and the rational foundation of Jewish belief, as opposed to the unnatural nature of the Christian creed. Similarly to Averroes’ Desicive Treatise, BH begins by asking whether the study of philosophy is forbidden, permissible or mandatory for the religious practitioner, and concludes with Del Medigo’s own idiosyncratic solution, which does not concern us here.7 While the work touches upon other themes as well (including a critical account of the Kabbalah tradition), its focal points are the relation between reason and revelation and the rational foundations of Judaism. It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars working in the field of Jewish studies refer to BH as Del Medigo’s most significant achievement, mentioning his earlier works, if at all, only in passing.8 Moreover, it seems that BH is the sole reason why scholars of Jewish thought found interest in Del Medigo in the first place, and it is by virtue of BH that Del Medigo was canonized as a Renaissance ‘Jewish philosopher’. Del Medigo’s other, more ‘technical’ works mentioned above were only studied to the extent that they contained scattered remarks of a reflective nature on the relation between reason and revelation and philosophical practice. These notes are taken out of their original context and re-contextualized against the background of Del Medigo’s more systematic account of these themes, as discussed in BH.9

BH was published no less than three times, and two of these editions may be considered critical.10 The editio princeps appeared in 1629, and was known to 17^th-century Jewish intellectuals, among them Leone Modena and Spinoza11. The academic interest in BH began with the publication of the 1833 edition, published in Vienna and edited by Isaac Samuel Reggio. As noted by Giovanni Licata, Reggio was one of the major proponents of the Italian Haskalah, or ‘enlightenment’ movement.12 In addition to editing BH, Reggio had translated the Torah into Italian, and was one of the founders of the rabbinical seminary in Padua. Reggio’s activity should therefore be evaluated in the context of a certain zeitgeist, characterized by an attempt to reform Judaism emphasizing its rational foundations and arguing against Kabbalistic interpretations. Del Medigo’s endorsement in BH of a rational form of Judaism as well as his attack on certain Kabbalistic trends, accorded well with Reggio’s own thought. Reggio found in Del Medigo – who also lived and worked in Padua – a predecessor of his own interpretation of Judaism. It is therefore not surprising that, in the introduction to his edition of BH, Reggio explicitly associates Del Medigo and Maimonides with the same rational trend within Judaism, a trend to which he himself felt he belonged.13 The tangled relationship of scholarship, ideology, and biography, characteristic of the formation of Jewish studies in its early stage, can be clearly seen in this first modern attempt to canonize Del Medigo as a significant Jewish author.

Similarly to Reggio, the German scholars of the Wissenschaft des Judentums and their successors saw in Del Medigo an intellectual and ideological father figure, a celebrated predecessor with whom they shared the same vision of Judaism and fought against the same irrational tendencies, embodied first and foremost in the dangerous teachings of the Kabbalah. The accounts of Del Medigo’s activity that began to appear from the second half of the 19^th century, all, without exception, refer to the BH as the main – if not only – gateway to Del Medigo’s thought. In 1878, censored sections from BH were published as a supplement to the Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, followed by Adolf Huebsch’s Elia Delmedigo’s Bechinath ha-Dath und Ibn Roshd’s Facl al-maqal in 1882. Early in the 20^th century, Julius Guttman, another significant figure in the later generation of German Jewish scholars published his Elia del Medigos Verhaeltnis zu Averroes in seinem Bechinat ha-Dat. Yet of particular interest in the context of this paper is Heinrich Graetz and his reading of BH. In his History of the Jews, published in 1894, Graetz argues that:

It is a striking proof of his sober mind and healthy judgment that Elias del Medigo kept himself aloof from all this mental effeminacy and childish enthusiasm for the pseudo-doctrine of the Kabbalah. He had profound contempt for the Kabbalistic phantom, and did not hesitate to expose its worthlessness. He had the courage openly to express his opinion that the Kabbala is rooted in an intellectual swap.14

Aaron Hughes depicts Greatz and Abraham Geiger as 19^th century figures who “shared a common assumption that Judaism possesses an internal structure” which one cannot simply reduce to its historical record.15 Graetz’s ideological and polemical tendencies are clearly manifested in the passage cited above, where Del Medigo is praised for his rational methodology, again associating the latter with Maimonides.16 Graetz, Hughes reminds us, viewed the medieval period as the golden age of Jewish rational thought and Del Medigo certainly belonged – in Graetz’s view as in Reggio’s before him – to that highpoint of Jewish intellectual history.17

The attitude manifested by Reggio, Graetz, and other early scholars has dominated the study of Del Medigo ever since. Most (though not all) Del Medigo scholars in the 20^th and 21^st centuries seem to presuppose the following:

1 that the opposition between rationality and superstitious tendencies is the focal point of Del Medigo’s thought, and

2 that BH, where Del Medigo discusses the theme in a systematic manner, is the latter’s most significant work.

The canonization of BH in the field of Jewish studies, a process characterized by the two assumptions cited above, is a clear manifestation of the apologetic roots of Jewish studies to which Hughes refers in his book. Del Medigo’s reception in modern scholarship also manifests the second of Hughes’ main claims: the damage to modern scholarship caused by these apologetic roots. As mentioned above, while numerous works were dedicated to the study of BH in the last century and a half, only a handful were dedicated to Del Medigo’s other works.18 These works, composed in Italy, addressed traditional philosophical themes in the fields of Aristotelian logic, physics, and metaphysics. Moreover, in these works, Del Medigo, at the request of his non-Jewish patrons, intentionally omitted discussions of a religious nature that may have appeared polemical or contentious.19 Del Medigo’s Italian works do not discuss the relation between reason and revelation, not to say the rational foundations of Judaism. Therefore, scholars in the field of Jewish studies found little interest in these works. Yet since Del Medigo was canonized as a ‘Jewish author’, he received very little attention from scholars of the Aristotelian scholastic tradition, and his unedited works on physics and metaphysics were confined to the dusty shelves of various European libraries.

The story of Del Medigo’s reception in modern scholarship is therefore an unfortunate one, and does not reflect his actual contribution to Western thought, which consists more in his introduction of Averroes’ thought to the Latin West, than his shaping of Jewish thought. The majority of his works – the so-called Italian works – were understudied throughout the generations, and still are. Consequently, Del Medigo’s recognition and subsequent canonization in the field of Jewish studies appear to have been based on a misconstrued understanding of his literary output. Not only is BH given exaggerated attention, it is analyzed out of context, without reference to Del Medigo’s prior philosophical activity among non-Jews, which certainly contributed, at least to some extent, to the apologetic nature of BH. In short, Del Medigo’s reception in modern scholarship reflects a distortion of the historical reality and a reinforcement of a misconstrued historiographical perception, a clear manifestation of the wider phenomenon to which Hughes refers in his book.20

Conclusion

This paper attempted a critical examination of the roots of Jewish historiography through the examination of a particular case study, the academic reception of Elijah Del Medigo’s BH. Future studies will hopefully contribute to this critical endeavor, either by corroborating its conclusions or, perhaps, revealing the author’s own biased assumptions and thereby modifying or restricting his critical reading. One methodological tool available for doing so is that of comparative analysis. Scholars in the fields of Latin and Arabic medieval philosophy have also reflected on the ideological roots of a given discipline, and their conclusions may contribute, mutatis mutandis, to the critical study of Jewish historiography.21 Dimitry Gutas is one such scholar. In his The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Gutas criticizes what he calls the “Orientalist Approach” in the study of Arabic philosophy:

It is an unfortunate distortion with grave consequences to state that the issue of religion versus philosophy was central in Arabic philosophy. […] not only is what was in reality a legal debate mistaken for a philosophical controversy […] but also the subject of that legal debate is taken to be representative of all Arabic philosophy and its central concern.22

With few adjustments, Gutas’ critique may be applied to the case of Del Medigo’s reception as well. Employing Gutas’ terminology, Del Medigo scholars have replaced the study of “philosophy proper,” as it appears in Del Medigo’s Italian works, with the legal, meta-philosophical debate of the BH, taking this debate to represent Del Medigo’s oeuvre in its entirety. In addition, one may point to the “unfortunate distortion with grave consequences” evident in the scholarly reception of Del Medigo’s literary activity. To this “unfortunate situation”, to quote Hughes’ study, Del Medigo serves as single testimony among many others.