NATO’s Enlargement and Russia

In addition, many current and future weapons of this kind, as well as their launchers, are dual-purpose, and their character until the moment of detonation will be indistinguishable from a nuclear strike. This applies to heavy and medium bombers, tactical strike aircraft with missiles and bombs, ships, and attack submarines with missiles capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads: the Kalibr and Tomahawk sea-based cruise missiles,42 air-launched cruise missiles of the Kh101/102 type or the AGM-158, and Iskander-type ground-launched tactical ballistic and cruise missiles. Such systems and associated operational plans could also trigger the rapid, uncontrolled escalation of a conventional local conflict or even a military incident into nuclear war.

Neither Russia nor the United States—nor their allies—want war, and they have no real political motives to unleash it. But it should be remembered that in many wars, both sides believed that they were only defending themselves, fighting off real or probable aggression, even if it was they themselves that carried out offensive operations. That is how World War I began in 1914. That conflict shaped the follow-on terrible history of the twentieth century, and its consequences are still playing out across the world, including in Russia. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 demonstrated clearly that a nuclear war could begin because of a loss of control over events, not as the result of planned aggression. Similar, though less dangerous, cases occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961 and during three Middle East wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973, among a number of other similar situations.

Since the events of 2014 in Ukraine, intense military confrontation between Russia and NATO has been renewed in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and Black Seas, and the Arctic. Regular large-scale military exercises (including with the participation of strategic systems and the imitation of nuclear weapon use) are frequent demonstrations of force.43 Dangerous close encounters of combat ships and aircraft are a common occurrence. The possibility of a major war between Russia and NATO, which seemed irrevocably consigned to the past just a few years ago, hangs over Europe and the world.

The Collapse of Nuclear Arms Control

The military, technical, strategic, and political trends discussed above are destroying the systems and regimes of nuclear arms control built over a half-century through the great efforts of the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, and others. Scholars have warned about this scenario for years,44 and now the danger has become obvious to everyone.

It is clear now that the weakest link in the nuclear arms control system was the INF Treaty. At the same time, the main claims of the parties against each other on compliance issues could be solved relatively quickly at the technical level if there was the political will and strategic interest in solving them. But instead, the Trump administration has officially announced its intention to denounce this historic treaty and did it in August 2019. Naturally, Russia followed suit.

The crisis in nuclear arms control is also manifested in the fact that for ten years, Russia and the United States have not discussed how to progress to the next START agreement. This is the longest pause in fifty years for such negotiations. Although both parties fulfilled their reduction obligations under the current New START by the February 2018 deadline (though with certain misgivings from Russia), the treaty will expire in 2021, and this will create a vacuum in strategic arms control. There is little time for the conclusion of a new treaty, given the deep disagreement between the two parties on important issues. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration had been reluctant to extend New START to 2026 (which can be done once under the terms of the treaty). The paradox of the domestic situation was that administration was facing pressure in favor of the treaty extension mostly from the liberal community, that was striving for doing away with President Trump one or the other way.

The United States and Russia are therefore on the threshold of a new large-scale arms race and, unlike the Cold War, this nuclear missile race will be augmented by competition in offensive and defensive non-nuclear strategic and medium-range weapons, as well as rivalry in the development of space weapons and cyber warfare.

Beginning in the mid-2020s, the United States plans to modernize its strategic triad: new systems to replace the current heavy bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs.45 And Russia continues to modernize its triad, deploying and developing two new ICBM systems (Yars and Sarmat), one SLBM system (Borei-Bulava), and two heavy bomber systems (modernized Tu-160M and PAK DA).

In addition, the United States is developing the above-mentioned systems for limited nuclear strikes (Trident-2 SLBMs with low-yield warheads, LRSO, B61-12, and nuclear sea-based cruise missiles). And Russia is developing the strategic systems unveiled in Putin’s March 1, 2018, address (that is, Burevestnik nuclear-powered intercontinental cruise missiles, Avangard hypersonic gliders, and Poseidon long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed super-torpedoes).46 The impact of these weapons on strategic stability requires special analysis, but is unlikely to be positive.

In addition, this arms race will be multilateral, involving states such as China, NATO members, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Japan, and others. The start of a nuclear arms race would undoubtedly undermine the norms and regimes for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2015 ended in failure. The next conference in 2020 was doomed to fail, but was postponed by about a year due to the Covid-19 pandemics. Still it may end in the same way, especially in light of the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal and a number of other deep controversies among the treaty member-states. This would likely be followed by the collapse of the CTBT, which for twenty-four years has not entered into force because of the refusal of the United States and a number of other states to ratify it. Nor is there much hope for progress in negotiating the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which has been stalled for more than a quarter-century. Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely join the nuclear club, as may Egypt, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Nigeria, South-African Republic, Brazil, and other countries. Through them, nuclear weapons will sooner or later inevitably fall into the hands of international terrorists, with all the ensuing consequences.

Renewing Strategic Stability and Arms Control

At the Valdai forum in Sochi in 2016, Putin said “nuclear weapons are for deterrence and a factor of ensuring peace and security worldwide,” and cannot be considered “a factor of any potential aggression.”47

As can be seen from the above analysis, nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate confrontation.

By the early 1960s, the world had gone through a series of increasingly dangerous crises, edging closer to the brink of nuclear war. The culmination was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when sheer luck saved humanity from disaster. Only after that, with the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, did the construction of a legal, treaty-based system of control over nuclear arms begin.

A few years ago, the world once again embarked on the pernicious path of confrontation and military competition, as all areas of arms control stalled for technical, strategic, and political reasons. Only through the strengthening of strategic stability, rehabilitation, and improvement of the nuclear arms control system can we turn away from the path to the nuclear brink.

The Soviet-U.S. concept of strategic stability agreed upon in 1990 was perhaps even more revolutionary than the authors themselves understood.48 It stipulated that the two sides recognized each other’s right to a nuclear strike capability as a guarantor of their own security, but undertook not to develop offensive and defensive weapons that would deprive the other party of such an insurance. Moreover, the limitation of damage from a hypothetical nuclear war should not be carried out by developing disarming strike capabilities, large-scale anti-missile defenses, and options for the selective use of nuclear weapons. Instead, it had to be achieved through minimizing the likelihood of such a war politically and reducing the destructive arsenals through treaties, transparency, and confidence-building measures, as well as improving mutual understanding of military doctrines and concepts.

Such a policy is not possible if the powers independently develop concepts, operational plans, and deterrence capabilities, since those are always aimed at defeating the alleged enemy “if deterrence fails.” As stated in the Russian military doctrine, in an analogy to U.S. strategic documents and those published by other states, the purpose of the armed forces is “defeating the aggressor’s troops (forces) and forcing the aggressor to cease hostilities on terms and conditions suiting the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.”49

However, deterrence in a crisis may collapse simply under the weight of plans and capabilities intended to deter the enemy. Responsibility for the decision to launch a nuclear strike is laid by the military at the feet of politicians, but those politicians are hostage to the operational plans and technical characteristics of weapons developed by the military and engineers.

Only an understanding of strategic stability that is agreed upon by both sides and embodied in arms limitation and reduction agreements can put strict limits on destabilizing concepts, plans, and arms of nuclear deterrence. Elements of this philosophy were enshrined in the 1990 strategic stability document.

Now, as then, the conditions of strategic stability can only be imagined between Russia and the United States if this concept is to have clear meaning (elimination of incentives for a nuclear first strike) rather than stand as wishful thinking for international peace and harmony. However, after nearly thirty years, it would be crucial to update the agreed principles of strategic stability in light of the changes that have taken place.

Moreover, the very definition of stability in Russian-U.S. strategic relations should be expanded to include not only “eliminating incentives for a nuclear first strike” but also “incentives for any use of nuclear weapons.” With regard to deterring a conventional attack, it primarily should be based on sufficient general-purpose forces and capabilities and, better still, on agreements such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1990).

Further to that point, the meaning of the provision on “measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles” and “giving priority to highly survivable systems” should be expressed not indirectly but directly, and with mutual recognition that weapons systems threatening the survival of strategic forces and their command-and-control are destabilizing and should be limited and reduced as a matter of priority. If this condition is met, launch-on-warning concepts should be mutually cancelled in light of the possibility of initiating nuclear war due to false alarms, unauthorized use, or cyber sabotage.

In addition, weapons systems that blur the line between nuclear and conventional arms (that is, dual-purpose) should be recognized as destabilizing and should be subject to mutual restrictions and confidence-building measures.

Missile defense systems intended to protect against third countries and non-state actors should once again be the subject of a mutually agreed “relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms.”

Space weapons—above all, antisatellite systems—should be acknowledged as destabilizing and be subject to a verifiable ban. Cyber warfare against each other’s strategic command-and-control information systems is also destabilizing and should be subject to prohibitions and confidence-building measures.

Both sides should recognize that their nuclear doctrines and weapons could create the risk of unintended war as the result of an escalating crisis, which should be the subject of serious and ongoing dialogue at the state level.

Finally, the involvement of third states in the process of nuclear arms limitation should be based on an objective assessment of their forces and programs and on an agreement on the sequence, principles, and objects of multilateral arms limitation agreements.

It is extremely important to note that the abstract discussion of the modern meaning of strategic stability will remain fruitless, as demonstrated by years of the recent dialogue on this topic between the United States and China,50 as well as between Russia and the United States. The proposals that have emerged in recent years for multilateral discussions on nuclear issues and strategic stability as an alternative to specific negotiations do not provide a clear answer to the direct questions of format, subject, and expected results of such intellectual exercises.51 Such ideas are no doubt attractive to those military and political leaders who are prejudiced against nuclear arms control agreements, do not understand their importance, and do not know the history of the issue. In reality, however, the alternative to time-consuming and sometimes exhausting negotiations is not strategic discussion in the “clubs of interested parties,” but an unrestricted arms race for all, at great cost and with the growing danger of war.

Another extreme was the approval of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by the UN General Assembly on July 6, 2017.52 Without calling into question the good intentions of supporters of this treaty, it must be admitted that the treaty is completely unrealistic, both in theory and in practice, if only because all nine of the nuclear powers that would have to ratify it, in a rare act of solidarity, did not support the UN initiative.

But along with the many technical and economic shortcomings of this project, the main omission in the treaty is that it does not address the military and political roles that states associate with nuclear weapons, besides deterrence of nuclear attack: preventing conventional aggression or attacks with other types of WMDs and systems based on new physical principles; maintaining international prestige and status (especially if economic and political assets are lacking); providing security guarantees to allies living near strong opponents; obtaining a bargaining chip for negotiations on other issues; and so on. Over the past seventy years, nuclear weapons have become an integral part of international politics, military strategy, and security. Without changing this environment, it is impossible to simply excise the nuclear factor as a malicious entity from international relations: the system would turn into chaos and the existing security norms and institutions would collapse.

Only consistent and step-by-step treatment is applicable: disarmament measures, in parallel with positive changes in the international political and strategic environment. And it is only in the context of substantive negotiations on arms limitations, reduction, and prohibition that these updated principles of stability can be formulated.

The first priority is to salvage the essence of the INF Treaty. Russia and the United States should jointly develop additional means of verification, using confidence-building measures and on-site inspections, in order to eliminate mutual suspicions. Technical solutions have been around for several years,53 and only the ambiguous attitude of the parties toward this agreement—and the overall negative atmosphere in their relations—have prevented them from sorting out these disagreements. Now, after the treaty was abrogated, the two powers should as a minimum make a commitment not to deploy missiles formerly prohibited by the agreement on the European continent, and agree on appropriate transparency measures. For the time being this would give Washington a leeway in addressing its Asia-Pacific concerns and alleviate Moscow’s fears of surprise short-warning decapitating attack from its European neighborhood.

Then, if New START is not extended beyond March 2021, negotiations should be started as soon as possible on a follow-on treaty. New ceilings on the maximum number of launchers and warheads are not so important; they can be lowered marginally, even by just 100–200 launchers and warheads. What is far more important is the scope of the next agreement, which should address new threats to strategic stability described above. Besides limiting as usual ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, a follow-on treaty should count air-launched nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs, as well as conventional cruise missiles (with longer than 600 km range) according to the actual loading of the deployed heavy bombers. In addition, it should put under overall ceilings the new ground-based intercontinental cruise missiles, as well as land-based boost-glide hypersonic systems (with ranges longer than 5,500 km) as well as sea- and air-based systems of this type (with ranges beyond 600 km), regardless of the type of warheads—nuclear or conventional—that they carry. (The range cut-off definition is borrowed from the former SALT/START treaties, but may certainly be renegotiated.)

Restrictions or bans on fractionally orbital ICBMs and long-range autonomous underwater drones could be exchanged for measures of transparency and delineation of missile defense systems. For example, the sides could limit (by mutually acceptable parameters) strategic defense against ICBMs and SLBMs but allow regional missile defense and air defense systems for protection against medium- and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

In parallel, negotiations on space weapons should be initiated, beginning with the prohibition of testing any antisatellite systems against real orbital targets and establishing strict rules for rendezvous and proximity maneuvers of satellites. It is also essential to move on to discussing a mutual pact not to develop capabilities and methods of cyber attack against strategic command-and-control information systems.

Concurrent with intensified negotiations on the issues of nuclear disarmament and the limitation of non-nuclear weapons systems, it might be eventually possible to include other states in this process in a phased and selective way. All of these measures are necessary to provide a foundation for the real intensification of cooperation between leading powers in the fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism, which will otherwise inevitably increase.

Amid the current deplorable political and strategic situation, it may seem that the above proposals are utopian. However, experience shows that the situation can change very quickly—both for the better and for the worse. To avoid the latter, every effort must be made to achieve the former. The main prerequisite is the recognition by political leaders and elites of the leading powers that the task of saving and updating the system and regimes of nuclear arms control is the top priority, just as the preceding generation saw it after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The dynamic changes in the world order, military technology, and strategic thinking do not mean that nuclear arms control is no longer needed. On the contrary, these changes make arms control an even more essential condition for the survival of human civilization than it was during the past Cold War.

Alexey Arbatov is the Head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow.

1 An earlier version of this study was published at © Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Arbatov, Alexey. 2019. “Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee or Threat to Strategic Stability?” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 22, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/22/nuclear-deterrence-guarantee-or-threat-to-strategic-stability-pub-78663.

2 The USA and Russia have reached an agreement on the extension of the “New Start” treaty under the new U.S. administration of President Biden in January 2021. Nevertheless, the negotiations on all the mentioned treaties to be extended or revised retain great relevance (note by O. Schmies).

3 Dvorkin, Vladimir. 2019. “Preserving Strategic Stability Amid U.S.-Russian Confrontation.” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 8, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/2019/02/08/preserving-strategic-stability-amid-u.s.-russian-confrontation-pub-78319.

4 Tzu, Sun. 2019. The Art of War. Translated by Lionel Giles. Internet Classics Archive. Accessed November 30, 2020. http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.

5 Kaplan, Fred. 1983. The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 269.

6 Ellsberg, Daniel. 2017. The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner. New York: Bloomsbury, 100–104.

7 McNamara, Robert S. 1968. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York: Harper and Row, 61–62.

8 Bush, George. 1990. “Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability.” The American Presidency Project, June 1, 1990. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/263949.

9 For the purposes of this work, the term “strategic nuclear forces” is used almost as a synonym of the term “strategic arms,” although in the future there may be a discrepancy due to the development of strategic arms with non-nuclear warheads.

10 Von Clausewitz, Carl. 1989 (first published 1832). On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: Part I, chapter 1, section 28.

11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2017. SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1990. SIPRI Yearbook 1990. World Armaments and Disarmament. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–51.

12 Highly survivable capabilities refer to missile forces at sea and land-based mobile launchers. Heavy bombers in this case are not taken into account, since they are not kept in a state of high combat readiness, have a long flight time, and are not guaranteed to break through enemy air defenses.

13 Dvorkin, Vladimir. 2017. “Reduction of Offensive Weapons.” In A Polycentric Nuclear World: Challenges and New Opportunities (in Russian), edited by Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center: ROSSPEN, 54–74.

14 Putin, Vladimir. 2012. “Be strong: Guarantees of Russian National Security.” Rossiiskaya Gazeta (in Russian), February 20, 2012. http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html.

15 Ibidem.

16 Pilkington, Ed and Martin Pengelly. 2018. “‘Let It Be an Arms Race’: Donald Trump Appears to Double Down on Nuclear Expansion.” Guardian, December 24. https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/dec/23/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-arms-race.

17 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

18 Ibidem.

19 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.

20 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.

21 Ibidem.

22 Kremlin.ru. 2018. “Заседание дискуссионного клуба ‘Валдай.’” October 18, 2018. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848.

23 According to independent estimates, Russia has about 1,850 units of such nuclear weapons. See more: SIPRI Yearbook 2017.

24 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

25 These asymmetries included forward-deployed U.S. nuclear forces in Eurasia; the predominant share of ground-based missiles, especially heavy types, in the Soviet strategic forces, and the sea- and air-based components of the U.S. triad; and U.S. advances in long-range cruise missiles in the late 1970s, an attempt to create space-based missile defense in the early 1980s, and, recently, leadership in the development of defensive and offensive high-precision conventional long-range systems.

26 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.

27 See more: Oleg Odnokolenko, Oleg. 2018. Interview with Colonel General Viktor Esin, who said: “If the Americans begin to deploy their missiles in Europe, we will have no choice but to abandon the doctrine of launch-on-warning and move to a doctrine of preemptive strike.” Zvezda Weekly (in Russian). November 8, 2018. https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/t/2018117102-0iaAI.html.

28 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, James R. 1975. Annual Defense Department Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1975_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-150705-323.

29 Ogarkov, Nikolai. 1982. Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland. In Russian. Moscow: Voenizdat, 49.

30 Redstar.ru. 2003. “Current Goals in the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Red Star (in Russian), October 11, 2003. http://old.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html.

31 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.

32 Ibidem.

33 Akhmerov, Yevgeny, Marat Valeev and Dmitry Akhmerov. 2016. “The Balloon Is a Friend of ‘Sarmat.’” Military Industrial Courier (in Russian), October 12, 2016. https://vpk.name/news/165525_aerostat__drug_sarmata.html.

34 Putin, Vladimir. 2018. “Presidential address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.

35 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

36 Ibidem.

37 Ibidem.

38 This applies to U.S. systems such as the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (BGM-109), and airlaunched cruise missiles (AGM-84, AGM-158B, JASSM-ER). Russia is also increasing its arsenal of nonnuclear cruise missiles: Kalibr 3M-54 and 3M-14 sea-launched cruise missiles and the Kh-55SM, Kh-555, and Kh-101-type air-launched cruise missiles. By 2018, the number of high-precision cruise missiles in the Russian arsenal had increased more than thirtyfold, according to Putin, Vladimir. 2018. “Presidential address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.

39 In particular, such systems are being developed by the United States as part of the Prompt Global Strike program, for example, the Alternate Reentry System (ARS). In parallel, the Boeing X-51A Waverider hypersonic air-launched cruise missile is being tested for deployment on heavy bombers. Russia is ahead of the United States in flight tests of hypersonic gliders for launch by ICBMs (such as the SS-19 or the new Sarmat heavy ICBM by 2020). Putin spoke about the new Avangard system during his March 1, 2018, address.

40 Einhorn, Robert and Steven Pifer. 2017. Meeting U.S. Deterrence Requirements: Toward a Sustainable National Consensus: A Working Group Report. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 20.

41 Putin, Vladimir (approved). n.d. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Accessed November 30, 2020. http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf.

42 In 2010, the U.S. decided to withdraw the Tomahawk from nuclear service by 2014, but the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review announced the decision to return the SLCM to nuclear service aboard submarines.

43 UA-RU.info. 2020. “Russia Conducted Secret Military Exercises Near EU Borders—the Media.” Unified Information Portal (in Russian), December 17, 2011. Accessed November 30, 2020. http://ua-ru.info/news/41846-rossiya-provela-taynye-voennye-ucheniyau-granic-es-smi.html.

44 Arbatov, Alexey. 2015. “Nuclear Arms Control: The End of the Story.” Global Economy and International Relations 5: 5–18.

45 Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2018. U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 23. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.