The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, Vol. II

On the 7th of April, the National Assembly met at Damala, on the coast opposite to Poros, and half way between Hermione and Egina – the meeting-place, for want of a building large enough, to hold the two hundred members, being a lemon-grove, watered by the classic fountain of Hippocrene. Its first business, attended by turmoil which threatened to bring the whole proceeding to a violent close, was the election of Count Capodistrias as President, for seven years, of the Greek nation. Capodistrias was the favourite of the Moreot party, but disliked by the Phanariots, and hated by the island primates. The two latter would have prevented the election, but for the support given to it by Lord Cochrane, who on this account has been frequently and seriously blamed.

2

2

  See especially Trikoupes, vol. iv., p. 126, and Gordon, vol. ii., p. 364. Mr. Finlay approves of the choice, but, not caring to say anything in favour of Lord Cochrane, makes no mention of his share in the work. Vol. ii., p. 139.

 There can be no doubt, however, that, whatever may have been the subsequent shortcomings of Capodistrias, he was greatly superior to any of the other and native candidates for the office. None of these candidates had given any proof of statesmanlike powers or disinterested regard for the welfare of Greece. Lord Cochrane judged, with good reason, that that welfare could only be promoted by placing at the head of affairs a man who had hitherto had no share in party strife, who had proved himself to be possessed of great abilities and of generous love for the nation of which, as a native of Corfu, he was in some sort a citizen. Unfortunately, though for this Lord Cochrane was in no way responsible, the management of affairs during the time that must elapse before Capodistrias, if he accepted the office tendered to him, could enter upon it, was entrusted to a Vice-governing Commission composed of three inefficient men, Georgios Mavromichales, Milaites of Psara, and Nakos of Livadia.

The most important business done by the Troezene Assembly was the installation of Lord Cochrane as First Admiral of Greece. This was done on the 18th of April. Landing for the first time on the continent, Lord Cochrane proceeded in state on horseback for the distance of a mile and a-half that was between the shore and the lemon-grove. At the entrance he was met by Kolokotrones, who embraced him, saying, "You are welcome;" words that were repeated by many other leading Greeks, who attended and conducted him into the centre of the grove. There he was formally introduced to the delegates as the First Admiral. Through an interpreter he addressed to them a few sentences, urging the necessity of continued harmony, and of a prompt expedition against the Turks, to be conducted both by sea and by land. After that, placing his hand on the hilt of his sword, he took the necessary oath: "I swear to shed my blood for the safety of the Greeks and for the liberation of their country; I swear that I will not abandon their cause so long as they do not themselves abandon it, but sustain my efforts."

The election of Sir Richard Church as Generalissimo of the Land Forces was, in like manner, completed on the 15th of April.

The essential business for which Lord Cochrane had desired that the united National Assembly should meet at Troezene being now accomplished, he hoped that it would speedily adjourn, in order that the military leaders should be enabled to proceed at once to the work pressing urgently upon them. "The critical moment," said Lord Cochrane, in a letter addressed to them on the 16th of April, "has arrived in which you are called upon to decide whether the population of Greece shall be annihilated or enslaved, your country peopled with barbarous hordes, and the name of Greece blotted out from the list of independent nations." The National Assembly, however, spent more than another month in idle discussions, and in disputing upon matters the settlement of which ought to have been postponed to a less perilous time. Again and again Lord Cochrane had to impress upon them the necessity, in war as in council, of prompt and united action; but with very poor result.

"Once more I address you by letter," he wrote a few days later, "in the hope that you may be persuaded instantly to take measures to save your country from the ruin which protracted deliberations must at the present moment entail – ay, with as much certainty as a continuance of those dissensions which have hitherto so unhappily prevailed; and I follow this course the more readily in order that, as I have ever advocated liberal forms of government, my advice, that your Assembly shall bring its labours to a close, shall not be misrepresented to Greece and to the world. First, then, the agitated state of the country, by reason of the presence of the enemy, precludes the hope of obedience in ordinary course of law, which is as essential to the existence even of a shadow of republican forms as the practice of virtue and forbearance are to their reality – which, in states that would be free, ever must be accompanied by universal conviction in the public mind that power and wealth are not essential to the enjoyment of personal security, and are desirable or useful only as they promote the common welfare or administer to the wants or comforts of individuals themselves. The Grecian people, however good, naturally cannot be expected instantly to practise virtues which are the offspring of long-established freedom. Greece requires not, at the present moment, sage deliberations regarding permanent forms of government, nor permanent rulers; but she requires energetic authority, that she may be free at least from her foreign oppressors. If, without delay, the military officers take the field, if your labours be brought to a close and every citizen in his respective capacity exert himself to the utmost for the defence of his country, Athens perhaps may yet be saved, although that object assuredly is rendered far more doubtful by the unfortunate delay that has already occurred."

In entering upon his own share of the work no time was wasted by Lord Cochrane. He had already made himself acquainted with the naval resources of Greece, and done much in devising measures for augmenting them. He had resolved upon the first enterprise to be entered upon; and, while rapidly completing his arrangements for it, he did everything in his power to quicken in the hearts of the Greeks a patriotism as pure and zealous as was his own philanthropy. "To arms! to arms!" he wrote in a proclamation issued at this time. "One simultaneous effort, and Greece is free. Discord, the deadly foe you have had most to fear, is conquered. The task that now remains is easy. The youth everywhere fly to arms. The fate of the Acropolis is no longer doubtful. The Turks surrounded, their supplies cut off, the passes occupied, and retreat impossible, you can ensure the freedom of the classic plains of Athens, again destined to become the seat of liberty, the sciences, and the arts. Rest not content with such limited success. Sheathe not the sword whilst the brutal Turk, the enemy of the progress of civilization and improvement of the human mind, shall occupy one foot of that classic ground which once was yours. Let the young seamen of the islands emulate the glory that awaits the military force. Let them hasten to join the national ships, and, if denied your independence and rights, blockade the Hellespont, thus carrying the war into the enemy's country. Then the fate of the cruel Sultan, the destroyer of his subjects, the tyrant taskmaster of a Christian people, shall be sealed by the hands of the executioners who yet obey his bloody commands. Then shall prophecy be fulfilled, and Moslem sway be overthrown by the corruptions itself has engendered. Then shall the sacred banner of the Cross once more wave on the dome of Saint Sophia. Then shall the Grecian people live secure under the protection of just laws. Then shall noble cities rise from their ruins, and the splendour of future times rival the days that are past."

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SIEGE OF ATHENS. – THE DEFENDERS OF THE ACROPOLIS. – THE EFFORTS OF GORDON AND KARAÏSKAKES. – LORD COCHRANE'S PLAN FOR CUTTING OFF THE TURKISH SUPPLIES. – THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH HE WAS INDUCED TO PROCEED INSTEAD TO THE PHALERUM. – HIS ARRIVAL THERE. – HIS OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR SERVING GREECE. – HIS FIRST MEETING WITH KARAÏSKAKES. – THE CONDITION OF THE GREEK CAMP. – LORD COCHRANE'S POSITION. – HIS EFFORTS TO GIVE IMMEDIATE RELIEF TO THE ACROPOLIS, AND THE OBSTACLES RAISED BY THE GREEKS. – KARAÏSKAKES'S DELAYS, AND GENERAL CHURCH'S DIFFICULTIES. – THE CONVENT OF SAINT SPIRIDION. – THE BATTLE OF PHALERUM. – THE CAPTURE OF SAINT SPIRIDION. – THE MASSACRE OF THE TURKS, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. – LORD COCHRANE'S RENEWED EFFORTS TO SAVE THE ACROPOLIS. – THE DEATH OF KARAÏSKAKES. – THE MARCH TO THE ACROPOLIS. – ITS FAILURE THROUGH THE PERVERSITY OF THE GREEKS. – THE BATTLE OF ATHENS. – THE FALL OF THE ACROPOLIS.

After the conquest of Missolonghi, by which all Western Greece was brought under Turkish dominion, Reshid Pasha lost no time in proceeding to drive the Greeks from Athens, their chief stronghold in the east. The siege of the town had been begun by Omar Pasha of Negropont, with a small Ottoman force, on the 21st of June, 1826. Reshid arrived on the 11th of July, and, after much previous fighting, stormed Athens so vigorously on the 14th of August, that the inhabitants were forced to abandon it. Many of them, however, took refuge in the Acropolis, where a strong garrison was established under the tyrannical rule of Goura, and in this fortress the defence was maintained for nearly two months. Goura died in October, and the rivalries of the officers whom he had held in awe, now allowed to have free exercise, threatened to make easy the further triumph of the besiegers. The citadel must have surrendered, but for the timely arrival of Karaïskakes and Fabvier, each with a strong body of troops, who diverted the enemy by formidable attacks in the rear. Karaïskakes and his force continued, with various success, to watch and harass the enemy from without. On the 12th of December Fabvier, by a brilliant exploit, forced his way into the Acropolis with about six hundred men. He had intended only to give it temporary relief, but many of the native chiefs, gladly taking advantage of the arrival of a body for which, conjointly with the garrison already established, there was not room in the fortress, hastily departed. Thus the leadership of the garrison, comprising about a thousand soldiers, with whom were four or five hundred women and children, and more than forty Philhellenes from France, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, devolved upon Colonel Fabvier. The besiegers numbered about seven thousand picked soldiers, including a regiment of cavalry veterans and a good train of artillery. The Greek regulars and irregulars, including a corps of Philhellenes, commanded by Captain Inglesi, who attempted to raise the siege, varied, at different times, from two or three thousand to seven or eight thousand.

That was the state of affairs when Lord Cochrane arrived in Greece. That the expulsion of the Turks from Attica and the recovery of Athens was the first great work to be attempted was clear to every one, whether native or Philhellene, who had the welfare of Greece at heart; but opinions varied as to the best mode of procedure. Nearly all previous efforts had been aimed at the direct attack of the besiegers in Athens and its neighbourhood. General Gordon had established a camp of about three thousand men at Munychia, the hill from which, two and twenty centuries before, Thrasybulus had gone down to deliver Athens from the thirty tyrants; and Karaïskakes, with some two thousand five hundred followers, was stationed at Keratsina, on the other side of the Piræus. But the operations of both leaders were restrained by Reshid Pasha's establishment of a garrison in the monastery of Saint Spiridion, midway between the two camps; and, without wiser leaders than the Greeks had hitherto possessed, there seemed small chance of their chasing the enemy from his strong positions. Another plan, feebly recommended and yet more feebly attempted before Lord Cochrane's arrival, was to starve him out by intercepting the supplies of provisions that were brought from Turkey by way of the northern channel of the Negropont, to be sent overland from Oropos, a well-fortified magazine on the northern shore of Attica.

Lord Cochrane saw at once that this latter course was the one most likely to be of service, or, at any rate, the one rightly devolving upon him, while General Church was pursuing his operations nearer to Athens; and he was strengthened in this conviction by discussion on the subject with General Gordon, who came for a short visit to Poros, on the 21st of March, in his own yacht. To this end he laboured while he was waiting for the reconciliation of parties and the official recognition of his employment as First Admiral. "The fate of Athens," he wrote, both to Kolokotrones and to Karaïskakes, on the 29th of March, "depends upon our depriving the enemy of the provisions obtained by him from the north. The general and the soldiers who first devote themselves to this object will have the glory of raising the siege. For myself, I offer the heartiest co-operation of the fleet, accompanied by two thousand brave marines, and the use of all the war-steamers and transports in any port of eastern Attica. There is not a moment to be lost." This proposal was rejected by Kolokotrones. On the 2nd of April, Karaïskakes sent an ambiguous acceptance of it, which he cancelled on the 13th. "We are so mixed up with the enemy," he wrote, "that if we abandon the smallest of our positions we must resign ourselves to the loss of all. The Turks are so embarrassed by us that they can offer only a feeble siege to the Acropolis. Of this I am assured by several Greeks who have lately come from their camp. Therefore, my lord, I am deterred from assailing the enemy from the north; and I have the boldness to assure and promise you that, if you will aid me here, Athens will be free in a few days. With the help of two thousand good recruits, the enemy will not be able to resist our enthusiasm. I implore you, in the name of Greece, to assist me as soon as possible with the means of destroying him and of saving Athens."

That letter, and the advice of all in office, whether military or civil, to the same effect, altered Lord Cochrane's plans. "As he," said Gordon, who afterwards blamed him on this account, "unacquainted with the country and the language, could not form a correct judgment on the innumerable reports transmitted to him, it is not surprising that he was deceived by letters written from the Acropolis, and entrusted to soldiers who, disguised as Turks or Albanians, slipped from time to time through the enemy's lines. In these epistles, Fabvier and the other chiefs painted their situation in the blackest colours, carefully concealing the fact of their having provisions for many months."

3

3

  Gordon, vol. ii., p. 386. As Gordon was with Lord Cochrane at the time, and on intimate relations with him, it is strange, unless he himself, with far less excuse, shared the error for which he blamed him, that he did not advise him to pursue his former plan. Compare Trikoupes, vol. iv., p. 137, who blames and involuntarily acquits Lord Cochrane almost in the same breath.

 By them native Greeks and foreigners long resident in the country were deceived. Lord Cochrane, still clinging to his project for injuring the Turks by cutting off their supplies, was constrained to defer it for the present, and in compliance with the requests of the Government, of General Church, and of Karaïskakes, to co-operate in the direct attack upon the enemy in the Piræus. "I now agree with you," he wrote to the latter, on the 14th of April, "that the time is past when a movement in the rear of the Turks, and the cutting off of their provisions, could have the effect of saving the Acropolis, and I see clearly the justice of your observation that a decisive blow must be struck at once against the enemy. The eyes of Europe are turned towards Greece, and on the success or failure of the measures now to be adopted depends the support of your glorious cause, or its abandonment in despair."

Something was done by Lord Cochrane at once, however, towards the fulfilment of his first design. He despatched Captain Abney Hastings, with the

Karteria

 and five other vessels, to the Gulf of Volo and the Channel of Negropont, with orders to seize as many Turkish provision-ships as he could there find within the next fourteen days. One expedition was very successful. Off Volo, on the 20th of April, Hastings found eight transports protected by the guns of the fort. He silenced the guns, captured five of the vessels, and destroyed the other three. He then passed down the channel, and near Tricheri fell in with a Turkish brig-of-war, which, after some skilful fighting, he destroyed by shells that exploded her powder magazine. After that he proceeded to Kumi, where he captured a store of grain, and reached Poros within the time appointed.

In the meanwhile Lord Cochrane had gone to the Bay of Athens as soon as he could complete his arrangements for the present and future employment of the Greek shipping. "Four of the largest brigs at Poros are in process of equipment," he wrote to the Government on the 16th of April, "and five of the fastest small sailing vessels of Spetzas, and eight transports, with a thousand men, are ready at Hydra to proceed on service. The frigate

Hellas

 is victualled for two months, four gun-boats have been ordered to be built, and fireships are in progress in addition to those which were already fitted out. The expenses of these preparations have been, or will be, defrayed out of the funds in my possession. In addition to these disbursements, a very considerable sum, out of the money destined for the naval service, has been advanced by me for military purposes. I consider that the fate of Greece depends, in a great measure, on pecuniary aid from the rest of Europe, and such aid on the probability of ultimate success; but assuredly it will not be afforded if Greece proves unable or unwilling to exert herself against the handful of sickly and enfeebled Turks who continue to besiege the Acropolis of Athens."

On the 17th of April, Lord Cochrane passed from Poros to Salamis in the

Hellas

, attended by twelve brigs and schooners from Hydra and Spetzas. In his pay were a thousand Hydriots, two hundred Cretans, and a corps of Roumeliots. On the same day, General Church embarked with three thousand soldiers collected in the Morea, under Gennaios Kolokotrones, Chrisanthos Sessini, and others. These new supplies, with the troops already at Keratsina and Munychia, composed a force of about ten thousand men.

Five days were spent in organising this force, over which Sir Richard Church, though nominally generalissimo, had very little real command. The delay and the want of discipline which caused it were alike annoying to Lord Cochrane, whose little fleet was anchored in the small Bay of Phalerum, his Hydriot recruits, under Major Gordon Urquhart, being established on the adjoining shore. On the 18th he received a four hours' visit on board the

Hellas

 from Karaïskakes, a tall, bony, athletic man, small-featured, and swarthy, with flashing eyes, and a lively tongue, about forty years of age. On the 19th he and General Church went to inspect the camp of the famous Greek leader at Keratsina. It gave but slight evidence of military organization, and both officers and men appeared to Lord Cochrane more willing to talk than to fight. His presence among them, however, stirred up a new and fitful enthusiasm. On this occasion he brought with him a large blue and white flag, with an owl, the national emblem of Greece, painted on the centre, which had been conveyed from Marseilles. The flag was unfurled in the presence of seven thousand Greek soldiers, within sight of the Turkish camp. Through his interpreter, Lord Cochrane briefly addressed the soldiers, urging them, for love of their country, and for their own honour and welfare, to unite in a prompt and vigorous attack on the enemy. Then, firmly planting the flag in the ground, he exclaimed, "Soldiers, whoever of you will lodge this flag on the summit of the Acropolis, shall receive from me, as a reward of his bravery, a thousand dollars, and ten times that sum shall be my share of the recompense to the force that accompanies him!" Great applause, of course, followed that announcement, but not much more than applause.

Lord Cochrane's popularity with the troops and their leaders, for the time at any rate, was unbounded. Karaïskakes, Niketas, Zavella, Notaras, Makriyannes, Gennaios Kolokotrones, and all the other captains vied with one another in offering fulsome adulation to him, and pledging themselves to yield implicit obedience to his instructions. By word, indeed, they were more submissive than he wished. He had to remind them that he was admiral of the fleet, not generalissimo on land, and that the latter office was held by Sir Richard Church. Unfortunately, Karaïskakes and his followers were, from the first, jealous of General Church; and General Church, accustomed only to the management of a small disciplined band, was unequal to the troublesome duties appertaining to him as controller of a heterogeneous crowd of irregular soldiers, most of them trained as brigands, and accustomed to the half-lawless rule of their own petty officers. Hardly a day passed in which he did not complain bitterly to Lord Cochrane of the obstructions thrown in his way; and Lord Cochrane had to take upon himself the thankless functions of a mediator between a good-hearted commander-in-chief and his disaffected subordinates.

This state of things would at any time have been irksome to him. It was especially so in the condition of affairs represented to him. Each day fresh reports were brought of the desperate state of the Acropolis. "The affairs of the fortress of Athens," we read in one document, signed by seven leaders of the besieged, and dated the 22nd of April, "have arrived at a very critical height, and no longer any remedy is expected from within, and therefore the besieged are obliged to address themselves to the Government of Greece and to the commanders of her forces, and to urge them to adopt the best, the speediest, and the most efficient measures to relieve the citadel. The Government and the commanders have always replied with promises of the most positive kind to raise the siege in a very few days. We can no longer believe their word. To give you further intelligence, we send now five men, who will tell you verbally what we cannot describe. If, however, they do not persuade you, we tell you this is our last letter. We will wait five days longer, and we can hold out no more. We have been brothers, and remain so during dearth, sickness, and all evils. Our nature is like that of all men: we can suffer no more than others. We are neither angels nor workers of miracles, to raise the dead, or do impossible things. If any evil should happen, we are not to blame, nor has God to condemn us in anything." The bearers of this letter, and others who brought a like report, were carefully examined by Lord Cochrane, and by them he was solemnly assured that the garrison of the Acropolis, destitute of provisions and every other necessary, could not possibly hold out more than five days longer.

He and all others were deceived; but he alone thoroughly felt the urgent need of instant action. "As I perceive the ruin of Greece," he wrote to Karaïskakes on the 23rd of April, "in the delay now taking place, and as I have every reason to believe that intrigues are carrying on by persons of desperate fortune and worthless character, with a view to promote their private ends, they not being aware that the subjection of Greece to a foreign power will ultimately destroy the hopes which they entertain, I take the liberty of urging, as an officer who has some character to lose in this affair, that your excellency should caution the officers of your army against the vain belief that intrigues at the present moment can produce any other effect than the ruin of themselves and their country. The education which my countrymen, in common with myself, have received, leads to an attachment to the cause of Greece amounting to enthusiasm, and this feeling cannot but be increased by viewing the monuments of her ancient grandeur. I am ready to do my utmost to promote the interests of your country, but I am by no means willing to allow myself to be made the puppet of intriguers. I shall put an end to intrigue in the navy or I shall quit it, and I trust your excellency will excuse me if I adopt the same resolutions respecting the army, if you yourself cannot put it down. I have been but a short time in Greece, but have taken effectual measures to obtain that sort of information which is necessary for my guidance. This has led me to the resolution to act by myself and for Greece, so far as I can, whenever I find that others are either disinclined or unable to co-operate. I have moved the transports close to the Phalerum in order that they may be more conveniently situated when I shall learn the determination of your excellency and the officers in your camp. If that determination is to relieve Athens the night of the 26th is passed, the marines whom I have hired, paid, and victualled, shall co-operate; if not, I shall try to render them serviceable in some other quarter, and I will denounce to the world as traitors to their country those intriguers who are the cause of the captivity and perhaps annihilation of the garrison in the Acropolis. My advice to your excellency is, that passing the tambourias by night, without firing a shot, you join our troops in the olive-grove, where I will take care they shall meet your excellency, if such is your pleasure. I have been anxious that the glory of relieving Athens should accrue to a Greek, and especially to your excellency. That object I am ready to promote by every means in my power. The friendly manner in which we the other day met will cause me to regret, if in my next letter I shall be obliged to bid your excellency adieu for ever."

That letter to Karaïskakes was followed by one, written on the 24th, to General Church. "In forty-eight hours," wrote Lord Cochrane, "the question of relieving Athens will be at a close. I have told Karaïskakes what I think of the state of affairs, and have made up my mind to act accordingly; taking upon myself all the responsibility of not looking longer on tambouria disputes whilst it seems resolved by the Greeks themselves not to march to the relief of Athens. I have not sent the transports to Attica to raise the miserable inhabitants at this hour, when too late for them to be of the least use in relieving the Acropolis. If I had done so, I should have the load on my conscience of causing their heads to be struck off. I can assure you, Sir Richard, that Colonel Gordon and myself laboured long ago to prevail on Karaïskakes to do this, but he resisted every application, for reasons which it will be well if he can satisfactorily explain hereafter. If your men will not come on, and Karaïskakes's men will not in the night pass those miserable tambourias, which in that case are no impediment, what is the use of my detaining the squadron here? I have viewed the bugbear of a convent this day from opposite sides, and it is no more in Karaïskakes's way than the church of Poros.

"Since writing the above," Lord Cochrane added, "I have received your note requesting that six hundred men shall be transported hence to Karaïskakes's head-quarters in the rear. The naval funds have been expended and our funds exhausted in bringing forces nearer to the enemy. I am sure if you reflect on this demand of his, and that Karaïskakes's head-quarters are twice as far from Athens as the Phalerum, you will be of the opinion that it would be better to bring an equal number, or even the whole of Karaïskakes's force here, and endeavour immediately to do something effectual to save Fabvier and the garrison from the inevitable destruction consequent on the present mode of proceeding. If Karaïskakes wants more men he wants them to take tambourias, and not to march past them as he ought, for his present position is of no use whatever. Do cause some rational mode of proceeding to be adopted, or let us give it up; for we are now only in the way by occasioning jealousy and promoting the vilest intrigues."

The "bugbear of a convent," which Karaïskakes wished first to capture, was the monastery of Saint Spiridion, occupied by a few scores of Turks, who from it overlooked the Greek encampments on each side, the one at Piræus, the other at Munychia, with a distant view of Lord Cochrane's station at Phalerum and of Sir Richard Church's on the other side. Finding that Karaïskakes would not join with Church and press on to Athens, at a distance of about seven miles, Lord Cochrane had urged the co-operation of all the forces at Cape Colias, whence the way to Athens was only about five miles long. Karaïskakes, however, refused this plan also. He maintained that the only safe course was to preserve his position and strengthen it by the formation of innumerable small circular earthworks, known as tambourias, within which the soldiers could crouch by day and lie securely on the bare ground at night. In this way he hoped to starve out the garrison at Saint Spiridion, the capture of which he deemed essential before any formidable attempt was made upon the main body of the Turkish camp, in Athens and around it, and especially under the walls of the Acropolis. In vain Lord Cochrane urged that this mode of warfare, tardy and expensive enough at the best of times, was cruelly reprehensible when they considered the wretched state in which the garrison of the Acropolis was supposed to be, and the prospect of its speedy evacuation. Karaïskakes refused to move, answering each appeal by unreasonable demands upon Lord Cochrane for supplies of ammunition and provisions, which it was no part of his duty to supply out of the residue of the insignificant sum of 8,000

l

. supplied to him out of the Greek loan for naval purposes.

4

4

  Trikoupes, Gordon, Finlay, and all the other authorities, say that Lord Cochrane had 20,000

l

. He had only been supplied with 8,000

l

; and nearly all this sum had been already disposed of in fitting out the fleet at Poros, and paying the seamen's wages.

 It may be that Karaïskakes – a bold and shrewd man – was not personally responsible for his inactivity. His army was little more than a commonwealth of small ba